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ABSTRACT
This paper argues that histories of the Green Revolution are often underpinned
by commitments to theoretical models of technology and science in ways
which shape the parameters of such narratives in politically normative ways.
This paper explores the accounts of the Green Revolution in India given by
Vandana Shiva and Govindan Parayil and demonstrates the ways in which
these accounts are influenced by their models of technology and science. It
is argued that Shiva and Parayil represent key theoretical positions in
technological theory, determinist and instrumentalist, respectively, and that
examination of their Green Revolution narratives clearly indicates the ways in
which such theoretical commitments can determine the scope and content
of analyses of technology-driven development, and thereby exclude political
content necessary for the evaluation of the efficacy of such development and
the validity of the theoretical model.
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Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to use the history of the Green Revolution in
India to examine the ways in which technological narratives underpin and
determine the interpretation of case studies in the field of development. It
will be argued that these technological narratives can be usefully identified
as belonging to either instrumentalist or determinist camps. To demonstrate
this point I have selected two commentators on the Green Revolution,
Vandana Shiva and Govindan Parayil, whose work is well known to
people working in the fields of development and development studies, and
whose analyses align with determinist and instrumentalist positions, respect-
ively.1 I argue, using the work of Shiva and Parayil, that the selection of one
© 2020 The Center for Political Ecology
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1A clarificatory point on the use of the terms instrumentalism and determinism in this context. Techno-
logical determinism tends to be conflated in the popular imagination with what Reinfelder (1980)
terms the technicist position, the belief that technology is the major driver of societal change and
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of these technological models shapes the type of development narrative
constructed.
The significance of the influence of technological models upon develop-
ment narratives is twofold. Firstly, the technological model adopted alters
the parameters for what constitutes a relevant factor in the analysis and
evaluation of technological interventions in development contexts – with
factors deemed irrelevant becoming invisible – and thereby the criteria for
the assessment of that intervention’s success or failure. Secondly, the distinc-
tion between instrumentalist and determinist positions hinges upon a dis-
tinction between fact and values.
By portraying technology as value-neutral instruments of human volition,
and value considerations as external to the technological artefacts them-
selves, instrumentalism effectively places the design and selection of such
artefacts beyond political critique, and thereby renders opaque the role
played in these processes by the interests of those who wield economic
power.
The wider significance of this analysis is that the determinist and instru-
mentalist positions are present not solely in the retrospective analysis of past
developmental episodes, but in the projective planning of future interven-
tions. And insofar as instrumentalist accounts dominate both developmental
and technological analysis, the instrumentalist interpretation of past devel-
opment case studies serves as both guide to future endeavours and validation
of the continued application of the values and criteria they embody. I suggest
that if meaningful development is to occur – that is to say, context-sensitive
development that serves the requirements of those directly affected by it –
then the technological assumptions that underpin development analyses
and planning must be made visible and subjected to ideological critique. I
conclude the paper by suggesting that whilst aspects of Shiva’s history of
the Green Revolution may be problematic, the narrative put forward none-
theless provides criteria that should serve to guide both retrospective devel-
opment analyses and prospective planning.
Shiva’s Philosophy of Science and Technology
I argue that understanding Shiva’s model of science and technology is essen-
tial to understanding her characterisation both of the Green Revolution and
has its own teleology. In practice, however, most advocates of a determinist position hold that tech-
nology has the power to shape rather than determine societal development, and either reject, or
severely qualify, the idea that technology has its own autonomous course of development (Swer
2014). And instrumentalism, as a position in technological analysis, is often held to have been super-
seded by social constructionist approaches that explore the design process of technological artefacts
(see McCarthy 2017). I argue, however, that social constructivism is itself a form of instrumentalism in
that it too views technology as inherently value-neutral and pays little heed to the application of that
technology or the materiality of engagement with it.
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the role that technology played in it.2 The reason that Shiva’s views on the
nature of modern science are relevant to a discussion of the technology of
the Green Revolution is that she comprehensively rejects the notion that
any meaningful distinction can be made between science and technology.
Now, rather than this being merely a repetition of the familiar notion that
science is just theory, and technology the application of that theory, Shiva
argues that the business of science is, amongst other things, the production
of technology (Shiva 1988, 237). Dismissing the idea that the character of
science is academic, rather than industrial, and geared towards pure
research, whilst technology is the development of scientific theory for the
purposes of practical application and commercial exploitation, Shiva
points to a nexus between the mode of knowledge that modern science rep-
resents and the economic interests of modern industrial capitalism. Modern
science provides a naturalised ideology for capitalist economics which both
legitimates it and provides it with its means of development (Bridgstock
1998, 36; Shiva 1988, 234). According to Shiva, the ideology of science is
what she terms reductionism and technology represents the point at which
this ideology overlaps with industrial capitalism.
As a consequence of this partnership between economic interests and
modern science, Shiva asserts that science cannot credibly claim to be separ-
ate from society and politics at either a theoretical or practical level. By oper-
ating a reductionist epistemology and ontology, technocratic science
legitimates its own cognitive superiority in social and political matters,
whilst simultaneously absolving itself of any of the responsibility for any
negative social and political consequences of the “technological fixes” that
it explicitly offers (Shiva 1991, 21). For Shiva, the production of scientific
knowledge and its utilisation are not separate processes. Science, on her
account, consciously produces technology for socio-political ends. She
states that “the dominant stream of modern science, the reductionist or
mechanical paradigm, is a particular response of a particular group of
people,” namely Western capitalist patriarchy (Shiva 1989, 15). Science
depicts the world and its processes in such a way as to “open up areas for
exploitation and invasion” (Shiva 1993,129). And having depicted reality
in such a way as to invite capitalist exploitation, science provides the techno-
logical tools to effect such exploitation. Indeed, science’s continuing ability to
produce technologies of this sort is one of the reasons for the generally uncri-
tical acceptance of its claims to epistemological superiority. Thus, as both the
2The Green Revolution narratives given in the following sections are those of Parayil (sections 4 and 5)
and Shiva (sections 2 and 3). They are intended to exemplify the ways in which their historical narra-
tives are shaped by their concepts of technology. I take no position on the truth of their individual
historical claims or the veracity of their historical accounts, and merely recount their technological pos-
itions and the key features of their technological Green Revolution narratives. Thus any pronounce-
ments made in these sections should be taken to represent the views of Parayil or Shiva only.
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ideology and tool of capitalist exploitation, science is responsible for the
social repercussions of its technologies.
According to Shiva, modern science, both as knowledge and practice, per-
petrates violence both indirectly and directly against society and nature. Here
Shiva’s views on technology and science intersect with her ecological meta-
physics, according to which the properties manifested by any element of a
system under study are determined by the relationships which are taken to
define the context of study (Shiva 1988, 234; Swer 2020). Thus, the selection
of the context determines the properties perceived in nature, and the selec-
tion of the context is itself determined by the values and priorities guiding
the perception of nature, in the case of modern science these determining
values being reductionist. The reductionist ontological assumption that the
basic processes of a system are mechanical, and that all systems are reducible
to their constituent parts which are discrete and atomistic is thereby a mis-
representation of nature, as it ignores the fact that a system is more than just
the sum of its parts. By isolating aspects of nature from their natural relation-
ships and surroundings in its studies and theorisations, modern science pre-
sents a distorted model of nature.
This ontological distortion results in certain reductionist epistemological
assumptions, namely that knowledge of the parts of a system gives knowl-
edge of the whole, and that experts are the only legitimate seekers and jus-
tifiers of knowledge. It is this combination of ontological and
epistemological assumptions that Shiva identifies as the main cause of
much of the social violence and ecological destruction that we see today.
Interventions in nature in the form of technology do harm due to the pro-
ducers and utilisers’ ignorance of the natural system. The privileging of
scientific knowledge, method and knowers not only prevents the study of
the other properties of nature by denying the epistemological legitimacy of
other modes of knowledge, but also transforms that majority of the populace
who hold that knowledge into “non-knowers” through the creation of the
expert/non-expert dichotomy, even in areas of praxis in which the majority
regularly operate (Shiva 1989, 97; Swer 2019, 256–257). Thus, modern reduc-
tionist science carries out violence against humanity at an epistemological
level by removing its cognitive authority, and it also carries out physical vio-
lence against nature. It is the combination of this cognitive alienation and the
material consequences of this natural violation that result in the rise of social
violence and unrest (Shiva 1988, 232–233).3
3Shiva does at times write as if these exploitative features were necessary features of modern western
technology. I suspect that she is being hyperbolic in these instances, as opposed to making an essen-
tialising claim about all modern Western technology sub specie aeternitatis. Of course, this defence in
turn raises questions about which Western technologies can be held to have deterministic properties
and what it is that differentiates them from other, non-deterministic, Western technologies. And
whether it is only modern Western technoscience that has these deterministic capacities or
whether the technologies/sciences of other times and cultures have such capacities as well. Such
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Shiva’s Account of the Green Revolution
An awareness of Shiva’s views on the nature of science and technology
enables us to better understand the form that her Green Revolution
account takes. Shiva portrays the Green Revolution in India as a failure in
its conception, inception and consequences. Pointing to the global political
context at the time of the Green Revolution (i.e. the Cold War), Shiva
argues that the scientific movement which developed the High Yield
Variety (HYV) technology and which agitated for its adoption throughout
Asia, Africa and Latin America, was not motivated by a desire to alleviate
poverty and food scarcity in less developed countries as an end in itself.
Rather, it viewed this as the most effective means of suppressing the
spread of communism through those countries (Shiva 1991, 14). So, regard-
less of the Indian government’s motivations in adopting and applying HYV
technology, the very point of the existence of the technology was to serve a
political purpose: namely, to use the HYV technology to surpass nature,
thereby creating conditions of material abundance which would not
support communist insurgency. As Shiva puts it, “the Science and Technol-
ogy of the Green Revolution were an integral part of socio-political strategy
aimed at pacifying the rural areas of developing nations in Asia” (Shiva 1991,
52). In other words, HYV technology was intended to alter political relations
in nations deemed by the Western powers to be at risk.
In addition, the maintenance of these conditions of material abundance
would necessitate the continued provision ofWestern inputs, namely chemical
inputs. Shiva characterises the technological dimension of the Green Revolu-
tion as a “seed-fertiliser” package, due to the fact that the new HYV had been
bred to behigh consumers of fertiliser (usually 3–4 times higher than traditional
varieties). In addition to Western Cold War interests being served by India’s
Green Revolution, Shiva also points to the commercial interests being
advanced. By the end of the Second World War, Shiva argues, there was an
excess of fertiliser in the industrialised nations, and American chemical manu-
facturers sought to increase overseas fertiliser consumption to recoup their
investments. According to Shiva, the spread of theHYV seed technology is inti-
mately connected with this push to expand the American petro-chemical
market, due to the fact that wherever the new seeds were adopted, a market
for chemical fertilisers would appear (Shiva 1991, 104–105).
On Shiva’s account, the main selling point of the HYV technology to the
Indian government was its supposed ability to produce material abundance
questions are perennial issues in the Philosophy of Technology and whilst I do not doubt that a jus-
tification of Shiva’s position could be constructed, it is the case that Shiva does not attempt to provide
one. Consequently, her version of technological determinism verges on the monolithic and ahistorical.
In this regard, Shiva’s account might well benefit from engagement with more dialectical determinist
accounts with a broader historical scope, such as those of Lewis Mumford (1934, 1967) or Herbert
Marcuse (1964).
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using scientific knowledge to exceed the limits of nature. Shiva categorically
denies that it did so. The adoption of the American chemical agricultural
paradigm encouraged Indian scientists, government officials and farmers
to believe that chemical fertilisers were superior substitutes for the natural
organic fertility of the soils. Despite initial bumper harvests, Indian
farmers soon faced diminishing returns on their chemical investment.
Dwarf HYVs have a considerably higher nutrient intake than traditional var-
ieties and return far less organic matter to the soil, thereby disrupting the
nutrient cycle and causing micronutrient deficiencies in the soil. The wide-
spread shift from pulses and coarse grains to monoculture wheat and rice
farming has exacerbated this process, wheat and rice being soil-depleting
crops. Shiva attributes the land-degrading rather than land-augmenting
effects of Green Revolution technology to the reductionist scientific para-
digm behind it, which was incapable of recognising that “plants need
more than NPK (nitrogen, phosphorous, potassium) for growth” (Shiva
1991, 112), and viewed traditional sustainable agriculture within ecological
limits as “primitive” agriculture which under-utilised land.
In addition to the need for chemical inputs, the HYV technology of the
Green Revolution also requires intensive irrigation. Due to adoption of
HYVs and the movement towards wheat and rice monocultures, types of
plant requiring intensive water inputs, the demand for water increased dra-
matically. The construction of dams and new irrigation channels to provide
the necessary water supply has had significant ecological consequences.
Taking Punjab and Haryana as case studies, two of the Indian states
whose climatic conditions were deemed “well-suited” to the needs of the
Mexican HYV wheat (Byres, Crow, and Ho 1983, 33), Shiva argues that
the changes in irrigation methods necessitated by the adoption of HYV tech-
nology and agricultural methods has resulted in further land-degradation.
The new water intensive cultivation patterns have added more water to
the ecosystem than can be accommodated by the system’s drainage potential.
This has brought about a rise in the water table which, due to the high level of
salt deposits in the region, has resulted in the “desertification” of large tracts
of farmland through waterlogging and salination (Shiva 1991, 128–129). At
the social level, the traditional reciprocal system of water rights has been dis-
rupted by the centralisation of power in the hands of the central government
which controls the dams and the irrigation systems. This disempowerment
of the agrarian populace combined with the commercialisation of water
rights and other agricultural inputs has resulted in social unrest and acts
of violence, both against the central government, and against other classes
and castes. The possibility of further and greater violence increases as the
HYV yields continue to fall.
In summary, Shiva’s analysis of the Green Revolution concludes that the
HYV technology was the instrument of a Western socio-political agenda, a
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“technological fix,” and was designed as such. The reductionist ideology
which lay behind the construction of the technology has resulted in severe
ecological damage due to its mechanistic/atomistic view of natural processes.
In addition to failing as an agricultural strategy, the Green Revolution also
failed as a political strategy. The effective “de-skilling” of the peasant
farmer through the imposition of a new agricultural model, and the
reduction of traditional communal rights and responsibilities into commer-
cial interactions between individuals, has resulted in considerable social dis-
ruption, rather than social pacification through economic growth.
Shiva’s technological determinist perspective leads her to expect that capi-
talist interests will be in operation, overtly and/or covertly, in the technology
transfer of HYVs to Indian agriculture in the Green Revolution. Shiva holds
that technology is never value-neutral, that it originates within a particular
socio-economic matrix and is consequently both a reflection and a carrier
of the interests of the ruling elite of its place of conception and creation.
Thus, the transfer of a technology designed within a socio-economic
system committed to the maintenance and extension of systems of exploita-
tion is likely to create or reinforce similar systems of exploitation in its host
society. In this way, Shiva’s conception of technology goes beyond an under-
standing of technology as artefact, or system of technological rules for its
operation, and incorporates as a matter of course class, gender, and ecologi-
cal dimensions. As a result, evaluation of the efficacy of any technological
application automatically includes within its analytic framework the
impacts of that technology on class, gender, and ecological relations in the
host society. This, as we shall see with Parayil, is not the case with all theor-
etical frameworks for technological analysis.
Parayil’s Philosophy of Technology
Parayil, occupying a liberal, technocratic position, argues that technology is
essentially a form of knowledge and that occasions of technological change,
like the Green Revolution, are the outcome of what he calls problem-solving
activity (Parayil 1991c, 235). On the subject of whether a meaningful distinc-
tion can be made between science and technology, Parayil asserts that tech-
nology is intellectually and epistemologically autonomous from science as a
knowledge system. He explicitly rejects the positivist position on the
relationship between science and technology which presents technology
simply as applied science. Parayil concedes that the two disciplines are con-
nected but portrays the relationship as an interactive one between distinct
disciplines (Parayil 1991a, 290).4
4Parayil uses the term “interactive” interchangeably with the term “dialectic” in describing the relation-
ship between science and technology, and between the various components involved in the
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Aside from its dismissal of technology’s cognitive independence, Parayil’s
main objection to the received view is that it perceives the artefactual dimen-
sion of technology to be its essential characteristic. For Parayil, technology is
knowledge. Technological techniques and artefacts are products of that
knowledge. Whilst the epistemic focus of science is “knowing,” the epistemic
focus of technology is “doing” and most importantly “solving” (Parayil
1991b, 36). Also, whilst scientific knowledge changes through paradigm-
shifts which may involve conceptual and epistemological ruptures in
which some aspects of knowledge are lost, technology as knowledge is evol-
utionary and cumulative. Technology develops in response to changes in the
world around it through continuously improving antecedent technological
knowledge (Parayil 1991c, 241). On the subject of the social construction
of knowledge, Parayil sees it as something of a non-issue. Unlike science
which seeks to provide knowledge of nature, technology’s purpose is to func-
tion almost entirely within the social sphere. Technology exists to provide
solutions to social problems, be it a desire for greater efficiency in activity
or lower costs. The existence of a social problem results in the construction
of an environment in which technological development to resolve the
problem may take place. Those who determine the environment are particu-
lar groups within society, who are inevitably motivated by political, cultural,
or economic interests or concerns. Thus, any technological change that
results is inevitably socially constructed (Parayil 1991c, 242).
According to Parayil, technological change can be characterised as the






There is no hierarchy to these activities, nor a chronological sequence
(Parayil 1991a, 295; Parayil 1997, 171–172). Rather, they operate in an “inter-
active-dialectic” following the evolutionary trend of technological knowl-
edge. As these factors interact, they give rise to what Parayil calls a
“technological algorithm – ”a heuristic which facilitates decisions regarding
the best means for transforming the new technological knowledge into
material outputs and artefacts (Parayil 1991a, 297). The success or failure
of technological transfer, be it imported or newly created technological
knowledge, ultimately depends not on the actors posing the social problem
that the new technology is intended to address and creating the development
development and application of technology. “Dialectical,” for Parayil, has no deliberate Hegelian con-
notations, and instead refers to a dialogic process between parties involved in the development and/or
application of technology that is governed by rational considerations.
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environment to do so, but on the acceptance and adoption of the new tech-
nology by its intended recipients: those who will have to apply the new tech-
nology (Parayil 1991b, 41). This acceptance is brought about partly through
use of the technological algorithm, and partly through a dialectic between the
producers of the technology and the recipients, in which the recipients’ feed-
back further determines the nature of the technology eventually accepted.
This recipient/producer dialectic is the key to successful technological trans-
fer and takes the form of a trial and error learning process, or, as Parayil calls
it, a “selective-retention process,” which guides the evolution of technologi-
cal knowledge (Parayil 1991c, 240–241).
Parayil’s Account of the Green Revolution
By Parayil’s reckoning, the Green Revolution is clear example of “relatively
successful technology transfer” and technological change (Parayil 1992,
737). The key to understanding the nature of the technological change in
the Green Revolution, for Parayil, lies not in the transferred HYV seeds,
nor their chemical inputs, but in the knowledge which lay behind their devel-
opment, use and acceptance.
The technology change of the Green Revolution (which for Parayil is what
was “revolutionary” about it) was necessitated by the crisis in Indian food
production which was exemplified by the shortages between 1965 and
1967. These shortages were the result of the Indian government’s failed
development policies which, being based on the Soviet Union’s centrally
planned economic model, favoured rapid industrialisation at the expense
of the agricultural development (Parayil 1992, 753). The Indian government
required a means of achieving self-sufficiency in food production, and yet
could not achieve this goal through extension of agriculture due to the
absence of suitable land. This was the social problem that technology was
required to address: the provision of a means of increasing national agricul-
tural output by increasing the productivity of the land.
The actual problem-solving technological process took place in stages.
The initial stage involved construction of a national agricultural research
system and reform of the governmental agricultural bureaucracy to facilitate
the transfer and application of HYV technology to India. By 1962 HYV
Mexican wheat had been successfully tested, and by 1964 so had HYV
rice. In the second stage, the government initiated a nation-wide propaganda
campaign to extol the virtues of the new technology and carried out village-
level demonstrations of the new technology’s efficacy. In this way the peasant
farmer learned the new technological knowledge from the experts’ propagat-
ing it, and then chose to apply it themselves, resulting in mass demand for
the “miracle” seeds and the consequent importation of 18,000 tons of
HYV wheat from Mexico, “the largest seed transfer in human history.”
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Following the widescale adoption of HYVs, the increase in national wheat
yield doubled annually between 1970 and 1974 and India became self-
sufficient in food grain production (Parayil 1991b, 40).
For Parayil, what is significant here is how development of the technology
(its invention, innovation, and development) interacts with the diffusion of
the technology (its transfer and adoption) to bring about change. Through
the instruction of the experts and trial and error, the peasant farmer came
into possession of the new technology (as knowledge), albeit knowledge
altered by the technological algorithm into a simplified form that the
farmers could absorb and apply. It was only then that the HYV technology
as artefact and technique became significant to the farmer, once they had,
in effect, been given cognitive authority over them. And part of the process
of this establishment of cognitive authority, was the provision of feedback
from the farmer to the expert which resulted in the modification of the tech-
nology as artefact and technique. It was because of this epistemological change
that the HYV technology was adopted and successfully transferred.
Not only did the technology change give India self-sufficiency; it also lib-
erated the peasant. Prior to the Green Revolution peasant farmers had
obtained necessary inputs through commodity exchange, due to the non-
existence of markets. Post-Green Revolution the peasant’s way of life was
permanently altered within decades. Now they are tied into a commercial
system of agriculture, where agriculture is “a calling beyond mere subsis-
tence,” and they can receive wages for their labours. The need to gain
credits for seed and other input purchase forces them to enter the market
(Parayil 1992, 753). In effect, wherever the Green Revolution has taken
hold, material conditions have invariably improved through a trickle-
down effect.
Issues Regarding the Conceptualisations of Green Revolution
Technology
Clearly, Parayil and Shiva’s models of technology and technological change
disagree significantly, but what is also of interest are the ways in which they
concur. For example, both agree that technology and technological change
are social in nature, and that social interests play a part in the shaping of
technology. And both seem to agree that in the Green Revolution, the
source of the technological change is best understood through the analysis
of “technology as knowledge.” However, here the similarity ends. For
Shiva, the study of technology as a mode of knowledge is significant only
because its reductionist character forces one to acknowledge the political
character of modern science; whereas for Parayil, who asserts technology’s
autonomy from science, the study of technology as a mode of knowledge
is significant because it is the epistemological aspect of technology that
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effects technological change. This difference of focus, I argue, ultimately
stems from their different stances on the fact/value distinction with
regards to technology, which in turn has significant consequences for their
positions on technological issues.
Tiles and Oberdiek (1995) argue that at the base of the instrumentalist
account of technology is the assertion that technological artefacts constitute
natural objects, and are therefore neutral with regards to human intentions.5
By defining technology operationally, as material or conceptual tools, instru-
mentalists believe that they are offering an empirically meaningful account of
the nature of technology that in itself requires no further explanation, and
thus technology can be treated as a natural object. Elsewhere I summarise
the instrumentalist position thus, “Things belonging to the natural world
are held to be facts, and thereby value-neutral. By treating technology as a
natural object, it becomes a fact, and it too is held to be value-neutral”
(Swer 2014, 204). Any ethically or socially problematic issues arising from
the operations of technology are placed firmly on the value-side of the
fact/value dichotomy. Thus, what we do with technology can be subject to
political critique, but technology itself (including its conception, design,
and operations) is placed beyond such critique. On an instrumental
account, such as Parayil’s, technology’s presumed status as a natural object
makes it axiomatic in technological analysis that technology itself, as a
value-neutral tool or as body of factual knowledge, is above politics. And
this conceptual presumption has clear implications for the scope of Parayil’s
subsequent analysis of the Green Revolution.
For example, Parayil portrays the material manifestations of technology as
the effects of developments in technological knowledge; not exactly epiphe-
nomena, but certainly of secondary importance in understanding change.
Thus, if technological artefacts are of any genuine significance in under-
standing the nature of the Green Revolution, it is only at the level of the arte-
fact’s knowledge content (Parayil 1991a, 299). That is, the knowledge to
understand the artefact’s workings and to adapt or reproduce them.
However, as Shiva would doubtless point out, this view of the artefactual
aspects of technology overlooks any possible independence that the artefacts
may develop. Parayil operates under the assumption that technology as arte-
fact is nothing more than physical objects constructed by humanity. As he
puts it, “artifacts are only the physical realisation of technical knowledge”
(Parayil 1991b, 46). Unlike nature, which has a source of motion in itself,
artefacts have a tendency to deteriorate because, as Mitcham puts it, their
form and matter are not really one (Mitcham 1994, 172). Thus, according
5Tiles and Oberdiek (1995, 47) note the contradiction involved in considering something that owes its
form and existence to human design, i.e., was brought into existence for a particular purpose, as a
natural object.
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to Parayil, technology as knowledge is the appropriate focus for technological
change in the Green Revolution because if the recipient of the technology did
not have the requisite technological knowledge, and thereby the power to
shape the artefacts to their own ends, then the transferred technology
would have become extinct as the artefacts were used up or worn out
(Parayil 1991b, 41). Now, whilst one might concede this point with
regards to mechanical artefacts, like tractors or pumps for tubewells, it is
by no means certain that one can apply this kind of definition to biotechnol-
ogy, where form and matter do indeed seem to be as one (Mitcham 1994,
174). In so far as the HYV artefacts can operate independently of human
control, it may be argued that they be granted ontological as well as epis-
temological status. Shiva certainly occupies this position, arguing that
whilst the epistemological content of HYV artefacts may be pre-determined,
the seeds themselves exhibit a degree of autonomy.
In addition to the autonomous properties of artefacts, we might also con-
sider the question concerning the nature of technology’s social construction
and its bearing on the question of whether the Green Revolution was a tech-
nological fix. What is meant here by the statement that technology is a social
construction? For Parayil, as we have seen, this amounts to that recognition
that technology serves human purposes, and that the tasks that it is set are
framed by actors with their own political and economic agendas.
However, despite the social contingency of technological knowledge,
Parayil believes that by analysing technology at an epistemological level he
can open the “black box” of technological development that many econom-
ists and historians posit. However, in attacking the black-boxing of techno-
logical change by portraying it as knowledge change, Parayil simultaneously
black boxes the socio-political determinants of knowledge content. He
acknowledges their existence, be they through corporate backing, govern-
ment funding, etc., but due to the fact that Parayil insists that the ultimate
determinant of successful adoption of new technology is the selective-reten-
tion process of the recipient/producer dialectic, he feels that they are not
enough to determine the shape and nature of new technology. They can
give it a trajectory but no more (Parayil 1991a, 298).
Shiva, on the other hand, argues that the socio-political forces are far more
significant than this. To understand the interests of those social groups who
can mobilise technological production is to understand the ultimate nature
of the technology (Shiva 1991, 21). Thus, she dismisses Parayil’s claim that
the recipient/producer dialectic is responsible for the nature and success of
technology. For Shiva technological knowledge, both at the level of theoreti-
cal and artefactual content, embodies the intentions of those who brought it
about. In the case of the Green Revolution the new technology was used as a
“technological fix” to instantiate a new system of social relations. As we have
seen, Parayil’s account of the Green Revolution ignores the political context
12 G. MORGAN SWER
in which HYV originated due to his belief in the value-neutrality of techno-
logical knowledge. Thus, he sees nothing problematic in the transfer of
Western technology into India. Technological knowledge being value-
neutral, the analysis of the process of technological change should only
begin at the point at which the technology began to evolve within India.
The intentions behind the technological transfer are of no significance as
the technology’s evolution starts afresh. Thus, for Parayil, a “technological
fix” is nothing more than the use of some technological improvement to
solve a problem with technological knowledge.
Parayil’s model of technological change also fails to capture what is sig-
nificant in evaluating the consequences of the adoption of new technology.
Parayil implicitly forwards the notion that technology is a prerequisite to
development, and that movement towards a capitalist economic model con-
stitutes progress. However, rather than believing that technology is immedi-
ately progressive simply by virtue of its physical presence (the black box
theory Parayil rejects), he privileges a democratising interactive model of
technological development and acceptance, in which the users of the new
agricultural technology are just as much the arbiters of its success as the pro-
ducers. However, even if such an interactive process takes place, it by no
means guarantees the egalitarian process of technological development
that Parayil assumes. By taking value-neutrality as a given of technological
knowledge, Parayil turns a blind eye to the political dimensions of the
wider technological nexus in which HYV technology is embedded. He
thus ignores the fact that even if the peasant farmers of India were taught
a simplified knowledge of the HYV technology before choosing to accept
it, it does not follow that they understood the intentions that lay behind
its development and transferral. Nor does it follow that they understood
the commercial power relations into which they were entering. More signifi-
cantly still, Parayil’s knowledge bias results in him deeming a technological
change a “success” solely on the grounds of whether the new knowledge was
accepted and utilised by the peasantry. Having concluded on epistemic
grounds that the change was a success, he then points to the increase in
national grain yield that followed the adoption of the HYV technology,
and reasons backwards that it must be solely due to the change in technologi-
cal knowledge. In other words, having satisfied his epistemological criteria,
he then moves to a material evaluation. Thus, by privileging technology as
knowledge over technology as artefact or technique, Parayil overlooks the
social and cultural effects that the change in technological practice brought
about in the process of increasing grain yields.6 And by doing so he
6Parayil seems to view the peasant farmers as being a relatively homogenous group, representative of
“Indian culture” in general. No ethnic, religious or caste distinctions among peasant farmers are
considered.
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ignores the political and ecological dimensions of the Green Revolution’s
epistemic “success.”
By endorsing the fact/value distinction and characterising technology as a
form of knowledge, Parayil performs a double concealment of technology’s
inherently political nature. Placing technology in the realm of fact renders
it value-neutral. It reifies technology into a natural object and disguises the
social forces that determined its form and function. And construing technol-
ogy as essentially epistemological then etherealises that which has been
reified. The fact/value distinction congeals technology into a neutral
object, and Parayil’s epistemological characterisation abstracts that object
into an idea.
This section has indicated the extent to which Shiva and Parayil’s accounts
of the Green Revolution are underpinned by their commitments to specific
theoretical models of the character of modern technology and science.
Whilst I do not wish to adjudicate the accuracy or otherwise of their respect-
ive Green Revolution histories, I will make a few comments on the adequacy
of their theoretical models for the historical episode to which they are being
applied. I suggest that Shiva’s method of analysis, whether or not one agrees
with her views on science and technology or her metaphysical pluralism, has
a marked advantage over that of Parayil. By focusing on politico-economic
interests at the point of technological origin, and socio-political and ecologi-
cal consequences at the point of technological application, Shiva captures
more of the significant dimensions of technology usage in the Green Revolu-
tion. Lacking Parayil’s commitment to the primacy of technology as knowl-
edge in evaluating technological change, she is able to grasp the purpose and
effects of the epistemic dimension of the HYV technology as well as the
effects of the artefactual and technical dimension.7 Whilst Parayil’s instru-
mentalism rationalises away the political content of technological develop-
ment and application by decontextualising technology, Shiva’s mode of
analysis rejects the fact/value distinction, recognising that the presupposition
that such a distinction can even be made with regards to technology is itself a
political decision. By assuming the inherently political character of technol-
ogy Shiva’s analysis seeks the political dimensions of the Green Revolution
technology at all points of the historical narrative, from the context of its
development to the consequences of its application. This enables her to
draw explanatory links between the politics surrounding the genesis of the
technology and the socio-political ramifications of its employment.
Whereas Parayil’s account decontextualises Green Revolution technology,
Shiva’s recontextualises it. And in so doing she exposes its political character
7This does not mean that Shiva’s analysis is beyond criticism. One might, for instance, question the cen-
trality of the role she accords Western political interests in the development of Green Revolution tech-
nology, given the concurrent development of similar technology under the decidedly non-capitalist
and non-Western political system of Chinese communism (Patel 2013; Schmalzer 2016; Kilby 2019).
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and problematises the use of the Green Revolution as an exemplar for tech-
nological interventions in development contexts.
Conclusion
This paper has argued that the accounts given by Parayil and Shiva of the
Green Revolution are underpinned and driven by theoretical commitments
to certain models of technology and science, instrumentalist and determinist,
respectively. Shiva’s model stresses the political dimensions of technology,
both at the level of development and application, and the material and epis-
temic consequences of technology transfer. Parayil, on the other hand,
characterises technology as a form of knowledge and emphasises its instru-
mental, voluntaristic, and problem-solving features. I have suggested that the
type of narrative that Shiva and Parayil provide of the history of the Green
Revolution in India, and their ultimate judgement of its success or failure,
is largely a reflection of these commitments.
Analysis of these Green Revolution narratives also draws attention to the
ways in which the, often undeclared, commitment to a theory of technology
determines the scope of analysis, and the determination of relevant factors
within that analysis, in the evaluation of technology transfers. Shiva’s deter-
minist analysis understands technology as inherently political, and thereby as
involving economic, gender and ecological factors. By viewing science and
technology as imbued with the values and interests of the ruling interests a
particular class/gender/culture, etc. Shiva’s analysis focuses on the ideologi-
cal and metaphysical dimensions of the technology transferred, its operating
assumptions, the model of nature it instantiates, its epistemological norms,
its cognitive hierarchies, etc. and the interests that they serve as intrinsic fea-
tures of the technology itself. Any assessment of the efficacy or success of a
technology transfer necessarily involves considerations of the effects of that
technology. However when “technology” is understood in the expanded
sense of Shiva’s determinism, as artefact, knowledge, activity, metaphysics,
and values, then the assessment must include all these elements as essential
factors in forming an evaluative perspective. Parayil’s analysis, on the other,
takes it as given that technology is value-neutral. Consequently, the socio-
economic context of the technology’s development is of no importance.
The technology, understood on this account as essentially a form of knowl-
edge, is outside the sphere of the political, and its success or failure can be
assessed primarily by the diffusion of that knowledge and its application,
and ultimately with reference to the abstract calculus of units produced
per hectare.
In closing, I suggest that the analysis given here of the role played by tech-
nological theory in shaping historical narratives of the Green Revolution is
not merely of historiographical relevance. The conceptual frameworks
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provided by theories of technology are employed both to analyse past epi-
sodes in the history of development, and to construct and evaluate future
development projects. Though the positions taken by Shiva and Parayil
might seem extreme, they represent instances of theoretical traditions that
are still operative and influential. Shiva’s technological determinism rep-
resents the minority view in technological analysis but her broad, socio-pol-
itical model of technology continues to inform contemporary critiques of
GMOs, water use, indigenous rights, and the commodification of nature.
Parayil’s instrumentalism is a version of the epistemology-focused social
constructivism that appears to be the default position of many involved in
development analysis8 and technology studies.9 I suggest that it is imperative
that the technological models present in development narratives, past and
future, be identified and critical scrutinised, for both have clear normative
political implications.
This paper has analysed two development narratives regarding the same
technological event and argued that, due to the competing technological the-
ories that underlie these narratives, the two narratives produce very different
assessments of the Green Revolution’s efficacy. Whilst it would be wrong to
extrapolate from this single technological instance to an account of the
nature of technology that applied to all forms of technology (as Shiva
appears to do on occasion) or even the use of the same technology in
different historical or geopolitical contexts, it would be equally mistaken to
assume that the Green Revolution is sui generis from a technological perspec-
tive. Rather than generalise from Shiva’s specific account of the nature and
function of Green Revolution technology to an account of technology in
general, I suggest instead that her account provides certain conclusions
that pertain to the nature and function of technological narratives in general.
Firstly, technological analyses are underpinned by theoretical stances on
the nature of technology, either in general or with regards to specific technol-
ogies, and those stances have political implications. This being the case, these
stances must be identified and examined as a necessary precondition to the
acceptance of any technological narrative. Secondly, there is no apolitical or
value-neutral technology. Technological narratives that suggest otherwise,
typically by maintaining the fact/value distinction, are themselves promoting
a political narrative. By portraying technology as value-neutral, these narra-
tives shield the political dimensions of the construction/selection/application
of technology from sight and in so doing serve the political function of nor-
malising such an outlook, and thereby endorsing the status quo. Thirdly,
technological narratives should as a matter of course meet the criteria
8See for instance Evenson (2005) or Evenson and Gollin (2003).
9Since the so-called empirical turn in the 1990s, technology studies have prioritised descriptivism over
critique. See Du Toit and Swer (2020).
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exemplified in Shiva’s analysis of the Green Revolution. Namely, that they
should provide a descriptive account of the specific social and political
context that brought about the development and application of the technol-
ogy under study, including the possible paths of technological development
that were not taken; that they should be normative in that they offer an
emancipatory norms from which the situation under study may be critiqued,
as opposed to simply describing the situation as it is; and that they should
identify viable possibilities that transcend the situation under analysis, and
thereby create transformative praxis.
I suggest that it is only if we apply such criteria to technologically-driven
development that we can envision a form of development that places techno-
logical control in the hands of those that development seeks to empower.
For, as the comparison of Shiva and Parayil indicated, a process of develop-
ment that uncritically accepts that notion of the value-neutrality of technol-
ogy is one that will efface the concrete materialities of the environment
affected: the ecological, the social and the psychological. And only a
process that subjects the technological presumptions behind development
paradigms to political critique can deliver development that does not
enable the exploitation of the environment, the exacerbation of social and
gender divisions, and the concentration of technological power in the
hands of an economic minority. Only a technology that is transparent to
its users in its design, operations and enabling conditions, can truly
empower. And a technology that is opaque in some or all of these regards
can just as easily enchain as liberate.
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